Critical Race Science and Critical Race Philosophy of Science

Over several decades, feminist philosophy of science has revealed the ways in which much of science has proceeded from “mainstream” assumptions that privilege men and other hierarchically superordinate groups and existing socially constructed conceptions of gender. In doing so, it has produced a research program that, while rooted in the post- Kuhnian philosophy and sociology of science that has been taken up by many students of scientific method more generally, has been used to critique great swathes of modern science and to reveal both the biases of the mainstream, and the transformative potential of a science that proceeds from the epistemic standpoints of women as well as men and from the research questions and concerns that arise from the goal of promoting equality between men and women

The Rule of Law in the United States

What is the American rule of law? Is it a paradigm case of the strong constitutionalism concept of the rule of law or has it fallen short of its rule of law ambitions? This open access book traces the promise and paradox of the American rule of law in three interwoven ways. It focuses on explicating the ideals of the American rule of law by asking: how do we interpret its history and the goals of its constitutional framers to see the rule of law ambitions its foundational institutions express? It considers those constitutional institutions as inextricable from the problem of race in the United States and the tensions between the rule of law as a protector of property rights and the rule of law as a restrictor on arbitrary power and a guarantor of legal equality. In that context, it explores the distinctive role of Black liberation movements in developing the American rule of law. Finally, it considers the extent to which the American rule of law is compromised at its frontiers, and the extent that those compromises undermine legal protections Americans enjoy in the interior. It asks how America reflects the legal contradictions of capitalism and empire outside its borders, and the impact of those contradictions on its external goals. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on www.bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law and the Northwestern Open Access Fund, provided by Northwestern University Libraries

Institutions and Instrumentalization in International Law

Reviewing: Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Fiduciaries of Humanity: How International Law Constitutes Authority (Oxford University Press 2016)

Institutional Values, or How to Say What Democracy Is

In this paper, I describe a category of political values that I call “institutional values.” An institutional value is distinct from an ordinary political value like justice by having both descriptive and evaluative components. I defend a method of sorting out correct from incorrect conceptions of an institutional value that relies on two ideas: coherence and verisimilitud

The Rule of Law in the United States

What is the American rule of law? Is it a paradigm case of the strong constitutionalism concept of the rule of law or has it fallen short of its rule of law ambitions? This open access book traces the promise and paradox of the American rule of law in three interwoven ways. It focuses on explicating the ideals of the American rule of law by asking: how do we interpret its history and the goals of its constitutional framers to see the rule of law ambitions its foundational institutions express? It considers those constitutional institutions as inextricable from the problem of race in the United States and the tensions between the rule of law as a protector of property rights and the rule of law as a restrictor on arbitrary power and a guarantor of legal equality. In that context, it explores the distinctive role of Black liberation movements in developing the American rule of law. Finally, it considers the extent to which the American rule of law is compromised at its frontiers, and the extent that those compromises undermine legal protections Americans enjoy in the interior. It asks how America reflects the legal contradictions of capitalism and empire outside its borders, and the impact of those contradictions on its external goals. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on www.bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law and the Northwestern Open Access Fund, provided by Northwestern University Libraries

Reconstituting We the People: Frederick Douglass and Jürgen Habermas in Conversation

This Article draws on Black American intellectual history to offer an approach to fundamental questions of constitutional theory from the standpoint of the politically excluded. Democratic constitutional theory is vexed by a series of well-known challenges rooted in the inability to justify law without democracy (“the countermajoritarian difficulty”) and the inability to justify any particular composition of the popular demos without law (“the problem of constituent power”). Under conditions of genuine egalitarian political inclusion, a constitutional conception of popular sovereignty derived primarily from the civic republican constitutional patriotism associated with Jürgen Habermas and others can resolve these challenges by providing a conceptual basis for understanding the constitutional demos as a corporate body extending across time and capable of ongoing political legitimation. Unfortunately, the constitutional conception cannot justify states, such as the United States, characterized by the persistent exclusion of some legitimate members of the demos from political institutions. The resolution to this problem can be found in an important tradition in Black American constitutional thought, beginning with Frederick Douglass, which represents American constitutional institutions as conditionally worthy of attachment in virtue of their latent normative potential. The correct conception of constitutional legitimacy for the United States combines Douglass’s insights, and those of his intellectual heirs, with those working in the tradition which Habermas represents